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SOLITUDE, LEADERSHIP, AND LAWYERS
Amul R . Thapar* & Samuel Rudman**
LEAD YOURSELF FIRST: INSPIRING LEADERSHIP THROUGH SOLITUDE.
By Raymond M . Kethledge and Michael S . Erwin. New York:
Bloomsbury Publishing 2017. Pp. xxi, 188. Cloth, $27; paper, $17.
INTRODUCTION
Lead Yourself First: Inspiring Leadership Through Solitude bears all the
hallmarks of a well-crafted legal argument. That makes good sense, because
it was coauthored by a great lawyer. Lawyers, however, do not play a large
role in the book. We were curious to know whether the book’s core argu-
ment—that solitude is indispensable to leadership—applies to law.
To do so, we test the book’s argument on its own terms. The book de-
velops its argument in two ways: by reviewing historical examples and by in-
terviewing contemporary leaders from all walks of life. Following the book’s
lead, we apply its hypothesis to a historical example with which we are famil-
iar, and we discuss solitude with modern-day lawyers. We conclude that the
book’s lessons about solitude and leadership apply just as squarely to lawyers
as they do to other leaders.
I. THE BOOK’SARGUMENT
Lead Yourself First concludes with a radical, countercultural prescrip-
tion: make yourself less available, let emails sit for hours, and put away your
phone (pp. 182–83). The rest of the book demonstrates what we risk unless
we do so: our ability to engage in deliberate solitude, and, therefore, our abil-
ity to do the clear thinking that ought to precede leadership. The book’s ar-
gument is serious business. All leaders—famous ones and everyday ones,
across cultures and in different contexts—depend on solitude to be better at
what they do, and you should too.1
At bottom, this is a book about how solitude facilitates leadership. The
book’s central claim is that solitude is indispensable to clear thinking and
that clear thinking is a prerequisite to leadership.2 Only through a deliberate
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Nothing in this
piece reflects in any way on any pending or future case that may come before the court.
** Associate, Choate, Hall & Stewart LLP. The authors would like to thank Joan Lukey,
the Honorable Joan Larsen, and Russell Coleman for agreeing to be interviewed for this Re-
view. They are grateful to Joe Masterman for his thoughtful comments.
1 . See, e .g ., p. 181.
2 . See chapter 1.
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regime of solitude, the authors say, can leaders develop the clarity of pur-
pose, conviction, and moral courage required to identify and achieve their
goals (Introduction).
The version of “solitude” that the book calls for “is not merely physical
separation” from other people (p. xviii). Instead, “leadership solitude” is “a
state of mind” in which the leader is “isolated from input from other minds”
(p. xviii; emphases omitted). People can find this kind of solitude in many
different ways. One could go for a walk in the woods or a long-distance run,
or one could simply “pause[] occasionally” while reading a book “to think
through a passage’s meaning” (Introduction).
Although it may come in many forms, what the authors aptly call “pro-
ductive solitude” is “hard work” (p. xix). It requires “working your mind—
not passively, but actively, as you would a large muscle—as you break down
and sort and synthesize what is already there” (p. xix). When done properly,
“the result is an insight, or even a broader vision, that brings mind and soul
together in clear-eyed, inspired conviction” (p. xix). “[T]hat kind of convic-
tion,” the book argues, “is the foundation of leadership” (p. xix).
The book then illustrates how solitude enhances four traits of effective
leaders: “clarity, creativity, emotional balance, and moral courage” (pp. xii–
xiii). It does so by examining how famous leaders used different kinds of
productive solitude to cultivate each trait. Readers will learn how Dwight Ei-
senhower, while planning the largest amphibious invasion in history, carved
out time alone to write memos to himself (pp. 36–40). Why did he do so?
Because he believed it allowed him to think clearly about whether to order
the D-day landings.3 Readers will see how Jane Goodall cultivated her intui-
tions, and revolutionized the way humans relate to animals, by trusting her
instincts and abandoning the company of her escorts in Tanzania (pp. 45–
46). And readers will observe how Martin Luther King Jr. summoned incred-
ible courage by reflecting on his faith while sitting alone at the dining room
table late at night during the Montgomery bus boycott (pp. 161–63). These
gripping accounts make for fascinating reading, and the authors trace the
role of solitude through each one, as well as several other high-profile histor-
ical examples.
The historical examples, however, are only half the story. The other half
comes from conversations with contemporary leaders who use solitude in an
everyday way to which we can more readily relate. Readers will meet charac-
ters like Dena Braeger, the West Point graduate who resisted the expectation
that she would be constantly available to her subordinates as a company
commander in Iraq, and who continues to carve out time alone for activities
like hiking, during which she reflects on how to lead her six children
(pp. 57–58). Or Doug Conant, the former CEO of the Campbell Soup Com-
pany, who blocks off thirty minutes every morning to focus on his “first
principles”: “my family, my work, my community, my faith, and my person-
3 . See pp. 36–40.
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al well-being.”4 And Dan Brostek, the former corporate executive who does
his deepest thinking during trail runs, which “reboot[]” his mind and helped
him find the moral courage to leave his high-paying job for a nonprofit or-
ganization.5 These characters, and dozens of others, drive home the book’s
key insight: whether you lead armies, a corporation, a small team, or your
family, solitude will make you a better thinker, and therefore a better leader.
The book concludes with suggestions for how leaders today can embrace
solitude despite the challenges of the digital age and the deluge of readily
available information that has overwhelmed many of the ways leaders might
naturally have found solitude in the past (pp. 181–88). As the book recogniz-
es, some of its recommendations are difficult. Not everyone will be able to
“mark off sixty or ninety minutes on his calendar each day for time to think”
(p. 182). And, depending on one’s rank, it may be unwise to check email
“only intermittently,” so that some messages “go unanswered for hours ra-
ther than minutes” (p. 182). But the book wisely identifies other forms of sol-
itude that most people should be able to take advantage of—if they are will-
ing to put in the work. “For analytical thinking or intuition, any activity that
does not itself require focused attention will do: walking, running, early-
morning rituals” (p. 184). The book’s recommendations run the gamut from
regimes that are physically taxing (like night runs) to time-consuming (jour-
naling or writing memos to one’s self) to something one could do every day
without radically revising one’s schedule at all (reflecting “in bed in the
minutes after awakening”) (p. 184). One of the book’s great insights is that
productive solitude “need not be an elaborate or drawn-out affair” (p. 184).
It can be “found as easily in the interstices of life as in its wide-open spaces”
(p. 184). “Driving on a highway, sitting in a waiting room, and dressing for
work are all opportune times to think” (p. 184).
What we enjoyed most about the book, however, was not the historical
accounts, the relatable interviews, or the thoughtful suggestions. What reso-
nated for us was how clearly the book reflects the disciplined thinking that it
seeks to help others cultivate. The book develops its argument across dozens
of characters and contexts without ever losing sight of the target. None of the
interviews or historical accounts is merely interesting garnish, for they each
illustrate a particular way in which solitude is crucial to leadership.
For example, the chapter on emotional balance begins with the story of
General Joseph Hooker and the Battle of Chancellorsville (p. 79). In April
1863, Hooker led the Union Army of the Potomac into Virginia to confront
General Lee and his confederate forces (p. 79). Hooker’s army was much
larger than Lee’s, but “Lee took the initiative” and successfully attacked one
of Hooker’s flanks (p. 79). Hooker “went to pieces” emotionally and had to
be carried from the field on a stretcher (p. 79). Even after the Confederate
4. Pp. 131–32 (quoting Interview by Raymond M. Kethledge and Michael S. Erwin
with Doug Conant, Founder & CEO, ConantLeadership (Mar. 14, 2016)).
5. Pp. 134–36 (quoting Interview by Raymond M. Kethledge and Michael S. Erwin
with Dan Brostek, Chief Digital Officer, Team Red, White & Blue (Feb. 5, 2016)).
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attack, Hooker outnumbered Lee by more than two to one, but “Hooker had
lost his emotional balance, and with it all the overwhelming advantages that
lay before him” (pp. 79–80). He ordered his forces to retreat to Washington
(pp. 79–80).
The book does not leave one to imagine how Hooker might have borne
the strains of the battle without breaking. Instead, it gives the example of
General Grant, who led his army over the same ground Hooker had almost
exactly one year later (pp. 110–11). In the midst of the ensuing battle, Grant
faced a series of crises that threatened his entire army. At one point, the ar-
my was at risk of “disintegrating,” as Grant suffered heavier losses than
Hooker had and faced more serious tactical problems (pp. 114–15). Yet
Grant did not break as Hooker had. He fielded reports of the battle’s events
stoically, sitting alone whittling a piece of wood on a stump (p. 112). Only
after the most serious danger had passed did he permit himself—alone, out
of his troops’ sight—to deal with the emotional agony he had faced through-
out the battle (pp. 115–16). The book then culls from the historical sources a
moment that makes a potentially confusing historical episode personal and
relatable: “When all proper measures had been taken . . . Grant went into his
tent, threw himself face downward on his cot, and gave way to the greatest
emotion.”6 The next day, having regained his emotional balance, Grant or-
dered his men to continue their advance south, rather than retreating as
Hooker had (p. 117). The army, which had fought fiercely for the last two
days and suffered nearly 18,000 casualties, cheered (pp. 115, 117).
It takes keen eyes like the authors’ to discern the role that solitude
played in Grant’s decision to stay the course during the Wilderness cam-
paign. The contrast with Hooker is particularly effective, as the leaders were
in remarkably similar positions. The authors deploy just enough historical
background so that readers can appreciate the similarities between the two
leaders, but without ever losing the flow of the argument in a lengthy detour
about the Civil War. The chapter on emotional balance is no exception in
this regard. It reflects the disciplined focus of the book as a whole. None of
the chapters, interviews, or anecdotes strays from the book’s collective target.
Instead, the book relentlessly demonstrates the different ways in which soli-
tude facilitates leadership, while showing what a deliberately focused argu-
ment looks like. The book is thus an example of the kind of argument that
lawyers should aspire to make.
Lawyers, however, play a relatively small role in the book, and we were
curious to know whether solitude is desirable—or even possible—in law.
More broadly, we wanted to test the book’s argument on its own terms. The
wide range of examples and the book’s apparently generally applicable rec-
ommendations suggest that solitude is necessary for leaders of all kinds. Tak-
ing our lead from the structure of the book, we examine the book’s argument
in two steps. First, we test it against a historical episode other than ones the
book covers. If the authors are correct, then we ought to be able to detect the
6. P. 116 (quoting 3 SHELBY FOOTE, THECIVILWAR 185–86 (1974)).
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importance of solitude in other prominent decisionmaking processes. And if
the authors are incorrect, then we should see that that solitude (or its ab-
sence) made no difference. Second, we interviewed a handful of lawyers to
hear their views on solitude and whether (or how) they use it.
Both steps validate the book’s argument. One fun feature of the book is
that it gives historically minded readers a new lens through which to view
their favorite historical episodes. We examine one of ours below, and we
were surprised to find how crisply the theme of solitude (or its absence)
comes through.
More striking, however, were our conversations with some of America’s
leading lawyers. These folks work in an industry that runs on email—one
where the default impulse is to do more rather than less, and sooner rather
than later. Yet each of them uses solitude, albeit in very different ways.
II. SOLITUDE AND THE JULYCRISIS OF 1914
Is solitude really a prerequisite to disciplined decisionmaking? Readers
can examine the book’s thesis by reviewing their own experiences. But if
your experiences are like ours, then they are considerably less interesting
than grand historical examples. And as long as the book’s argument sweeps
generally—as we think it does—then grand historical examples are fair game.
Indeed, the book invites readers to draw precisely those kinds of compari-
sons, by tracing the thread of its argument from D-day to the Montgomery
bus boycott. So how does the argument fair in light of other high-profile his-
torical decisions?
It is easy to identify famous leaders who sought solitude before charting
a course for their people. Moses went alone to speak with the Almighty at
Sinai.7 He stayed there for weeks without any human contact before return-
ing to give his people the law.8 Jesus similarly identified the principles that
would guide his ministry during a lengthy period of reflection without hu-
man contact.9 Immediately after returning to his followers, he delivered the
Sermon on the Mount.10 More generally, the Greek practice of consulting the
oracle at Delphi before making momentous decisions ritualized the isolation
of leaders at key moments. Philip of Macedon consulted the oracle before
beginning his conquest of Greece.11 His son Alexander consulted the oracle
before invading Persia (sort of, anyway; he dragged the priestess from the
temple by her hair until she gave him the answer he wanted).12
These ancient examples, however, come with considerably less color
than the book’s lively personal stories. One can recognize the structural pat-
7 . Exodus 34:1–28.
8 . Id . 34:28–32.
9 . See Matthew 4:1–5.
10 . Id . 5:1–5.
11 . See JOSEPH FONTENROSE, THEDELPHICORACLE 338 (1978).
12 . See id . at 338–39.
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tern—solitude before leadership—but little else. For granular detail regard-
ing the process that culminated in grand historical decisions, only the rela-
tively recent and heavily researched past will do. To test the book’s core ar-
gument, we decided to review the July Crisis of 1914, which precipitated the
outbreak of the First World War. Several leaders confronted difficult deci-
sions and faced incredible pressure. The leaders had to make their choices at
roughly the same time, and the decisions concerned roughly the same sub-
jects. But the leaders responded differently, and they achieved different re-
sults. After reading the book, it is hard not to see their key decisions through
the lens of solitude and leadership.
We are not historians, and we are not optimistic about our ability to set
the scene for the First World War in a single paragraph. But for present pur-
poses, the following summary ought to suffice. By July of 1914, Europe was
in trouble. On June 28, Serbian nationalists assassinated the crown prince of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire.13 The Austrian government was inclined to
respond by invading Serbia,14 but before doing so it had to consider the
elaborate system of European alliances that might spring into action in the
event of war. It was possible (but not certain) that Russia would come to the
defense of Serbia.15 Austria-Hungary would be hard-pressed to prevail
against mighty Russia (and less-mighty-but-very-feisty Serbia) unless Ger-
many entered the war on Austria’s side. And if Germany declared war on
Russia in defense of Austria, then France almost certainly would enter the
war on the Russian side, triggering the first general European war in a centu-
ry.16 Leaders on all sides had to make important decisions, and they had to
do so quickly. We examine below—in roughly chronological order—the dif-
ferent ways in which the Austrian, Serbian, and Russian leaders made their
key decisions, with a particular focus on solitude. The differences in their
approaches are striking, as are the results.
A. Austria-Hungary: Leopold von Berchtold
Austria-Hungary’s leaders apparently engaged in none of the disciplined
reflection urged by Kethledge17 and Erwin.18 The key player in Vienna was
the foreign minister, Leopold von Berchtold. Much like Hooker at Chancel-
lorsville, Berchtold lost his emotional balance early in the crisis. His actions
13. CHRISTOPHER CLARK, THE SLEEPWALKERS: HOW EUROPEWENT TOWAR IN 1914, at
367–76 (2012).
14 . Id . at 391–92.
15 . Id . at 399.
16 . See id . at 450. All these countries would have recognized that it was possible but not
obvious that Great Britain would enter the war on the Franco-Russian side, as it ultimately did.
17. Raymond M. Kethledge, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.
18. Michael S. Erwin, Chief Executive Officer, Character & Leadership Center; President
and Co-Founder, The Positivity Project; Instructor, United States Military Academy; and Lieu-
tenant Colonel, United States Army Reserves.
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in the days that followed give no hint that he ever regained it. On the contra-
ry, Berchtold apparently hopped from meeting to meeting, without ever
stepping back to reflect on what Austria’s key goals ought to have been. As a
result, he and his colleagues were left with remarkably narrow “individual
and collective fields of vision,” which prevented them from considering the
full strategic picture.19
Berchtold had known the crown prince since they were children and was
reportedly “speechless” upon learning of the assassination.20 Before he had
time to regain his emotional equilibrium or reflect on the empire’s strategic
goals, however, Berchtold was “immediately swept up in a frenzy of meet-
ings.”21 During those meetings, the Austrian government determined that it
would invade Serbia, provided that Austria could be certain of German sup-
port—that is, a commitment by the Germans to join the war if Russia de-
fended Serbia.22
Regardless of whether that was the right course, the way in which the
Austrians went about securing German support reads like a cautionary tale
about how not to make important decisions or lead others under pressure.
Within a week of the assassination, the German government suggested it
would support an Austrian attack on Serbia so long as “the objectives were
clearly defined and the diplomatic situation favourable.”23 Two days later,
Berchtold dispatched his chief of staff, Count Hoyos, to Berlin to secure
Germany’s support.24 Given Berchtold’s goal and the available information,
one might have expected Hoyos to leave for Berlin armed with precise Aus-
trian goals and a coherent account of the likely diplomatic fallout.
But the entire Austrian decisionmaking apparatus had been swept away
by the tide of events. When Hoyos arrived in Berlin, the German foreign
minister asked (predictably) what Austria’s war goals would be.25 Berchtold
had not instructed Hoyos on that point, and it is possible he had not serious-
ly considered the issue at all. So, proceeding on the theory that a bold face
carries the day, Hoyos improvised.26 He responded that Austria planned to
partition a defeated Serbia between itself, Bulgaria, and Romania.27 Hoyos’s
response was not just a lie (there was no such plan); it was an illegal and po-
tentially disastrous one.28 In a minor sense, it was illegal because Hoyos had
no authority to make Austria’s policy.29 More importantly, it was illegal be-
19. CLARK, supra note 13, at 429.
20 . Id . at 395–96.
21 . Id . at 396.
22 . See id . at 399–402.
23 . Id . at 412.
24 . See id . at 401–02, 412.
25 . Id . at 423.
26 . Id .
27 . Id .
28 . See id .
29 . Id .
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cause the prime minister of Hungary—whose approval was a constitutional
prerequisite to any declaration of war by the Austro-Hungarian Empire—
was implacably opposed to the annexation of any Serbian territory and
would not approve a war on those terms.30 Yet Hoyos had no choice but to
improvise, for the “hive-like structure of the Austro-Hungarian political
elite” had failed to make the decisions that were required or to furnish him
with answers to questions they must have anticipated.31 Berchtold had not
done the hard analytical work required to frame Austria’s pitch to its indis-
pensable ally.
The absence of clear thinking that left Hoyos so ill-prepared likewise ap-
pears on the face of the documents that the Austrian government produced
during the crisis. Instead of the answers Germany needed, Berchtold sent
Hoyos to Berlin with a letter from the Austro-Hungarian emperor to the
German kaiser that had been drafted by the Austrian foreign ministry.32 The
letter contained almost no specifics, let alone a pointed request for German
approval of a particular approach to the crisis. Instead, lawyers will recognize
the kinds of lazy arguments that one can produce without knowing much
about the case at all, where passive language takes the place of analysis:
“there can be no further question of bridging by conciliation the difference
that separates Serbia from us . . . the policy pursued by all European mon-
archs of preserving the peace will be at risk for as long as this hotbed of crim-
inal agitation in Belgrade remains unpunished.”33 Historians have found the
letter striking for its “panicky lack of focus, the preference for swollen meta-
phors over clear formulations,” and the absence of any policy proposals, list
of options, or even a request for German assistance.34
One might dismiss these failures as small potatoes. Sure, Hoyos was un-
prepared, but he ultimately secured German support for an Austrian attack.
And the letter might have been clunky, but who has time for wordsmithing
in the midst of a crisis? Fair enough. But Hoyos’s trip and the emperor’s let-
ter are just two symptoms of a broken decisionmaking apparatus, which had
more serious consequences. Because nobody in Vienna stepped back from
the to-and-fro of the crisis, Berchtold and company lost the forest for the
trees.35 In all the frenzied meetings that followed the assassination, “[n]o sus-
tained attention was given to the question of whether Austria-Hungary was
in any position to wage a war with one or more other European great pow-
ers.”36 The Austrians knew that Russia would likely defend Serbia, which is
why they sought to enlist Germany. Yet they failed to consider the full stra-
30 . Id . at 423, 425.
31 . Id . at 423, 429.
32 . Id . at 400–01.
33 . Id . at 401 (quoting Letter from Emperor Franz Joseph to Kaiser Wilhelm II (July 2,
1914)).
34 . Id .
35 . Id . at 429.
36 . Id .
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tegic picture: what would a general war mean for the empire? The Austrian
officials did not ask that question before starting the war, and the empire did
not survive the war they decided to pursue.
B. Serbia: Nikola Pašić
No similar panic obstructed clear thinking by the key figure on the Ser-
bian side, Prime Minister Nikola Pašić. So far as we can tell, Pašić was the
only key figure in the Austrian, Serbian, or Russian camps who carved out
time alone to do the hard thinking that the crisis required. Unlike his Austri-
an counterparts, Pašić resisted being thrown immediately into a series of
panicked meetings. Instead, he spent the first hours of the crisis more or less
by himself.37 During those hours, Pašić apparently identified the guiding
principle that he would use to navigate the days ahead. By using that princi-
ple to discipline his thinking, Pašić was able to lead his subordinates, and his
country, through a genuine national crisis.
To pave the diplomatic path to war, Austria sent Serbia an ultimatum.
The ultimatum was not an attempt to preserve the peace, but rather an “un-
compromising statement of the Austrian position.”38 The ultimatum de-
manded, among other things, that Serbia (i) permit Austrian officials to par-
ticipate in the investigation of the Archduke’s assassination in Serbia; and
(ii) more broadly, allow Austrian officers to enter Serbia to suppress the Ser-
bian nationalist organizations who continued to operate in Austria-
Hungary.39 These extraordinary demands would have required Serbia to sur-
render core elements of her national sovereignty. Austria assumed that Ser-
bia would reject its demands, and Winston Churchill called the ultimatum
“the most insolent document of its kind ever devised.”40
On July 23, Belgrade learned that Austria would deliver the ultimatum
soon.41 Pašić was away from the capital campaigning for an upcoming elec-
tion and had planned to take a short vacation to Greece.42 As Pašić was pre-
paring to leave for vacation, other ministers called and begged Pašić to re-
turn to Belgrade.43 Pašić refused: “I told [them] that when I get back to
Belgrade, we shall give the answer.”44 Pašić then boarded his train and began
to proceed south, toward Greece.45 Only when he received a subsequent tele-
37 . See id . at 63.
38 . Id . at 457.
39 . Id . at 455–56.
40 . Id . at 456–57 (quoting DAVID FROMKIN, EUROPE’S LAST SUMMER: WHO STARTED
THEGREATWAR IN 1914? 188 (2004)).
41 . Id . at 457–58.
42 . Id . at 459–60.
43 . Id . at 459.
44 . Id .
45 . Id .
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gram from the prince regent did he agree to turn his train around and head
to the capital.46
Historians have described his reaction as “bizarre.”47 We can’t be sure
whether Pašić decided to head south out of panic or whether he deliberately
created time to “clear his head and think over his options.”48 Whatever his
original motives, Pašić’s train ride left him with several hours during which
he was more or less alone. Unlike his counterparts, he was not immediately
thrown into a series of meetings, and he was not engulfed in the bureaucratic
hubbub that consumed each of the capitals during the crisis. He apparently
used that time on the train to identify Serbia’s key strategic goals, and he
never lost sight of those goals in the days ahead.
Before Pašić arrived on the scene, others seemed inclined toward war. A
leading minister believed that “no Serbian government could accept” the
terms “in their entirety.”49 The prince regent thought that accepting the ul-
timatum was “an absolute impossibility for a state which has the slightest re-
gard for its dignity.”50 But those opinions took no account of the military re-
alities: Serbia alone would be no match for the undivided attention of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Pašić therefore identified the likely reaction of
Russia as his North Star: If Serbia could count on Russia, then it could reject
the Austrian terms; if not, then it would capitulate.51
After his return, Pašić insisted “that no decision should be taken until
the Russians had made their view known.”52 In the interim, he remained re-
markably flexible but was guided always by the key principle he had identi-
fied. Despite others’ initial reactions, Pašić was fully prepared to accept the
Austrian terms when it seemed that Russian assistance was doubtful. Indeed,
he was prepared to “be ‘conciliatory on all points’ and offer Vienna ‘full sat-
isfaction.’ ”53 Word soon arrived, however, that Russia was prepared to mo-
bilize and to “take[] Serbia under its protection.”54 Assured of Russia’s sup-
port, Pašić helped craft a more defiant response to the ultimatum.55
The result “was a masterpiece of diplomatic equivocation” that artfully
rejected the key Austrian demands.56 The Austrian minister who received it
46 . Id . at 459–60.
47 . Id . at 460.
48 . Id .
49 . Id . (quoting Letter from Basil Strandmann to Sergei Sazonov (July 24, 1941)).
50 . Id . (quoting Letter from Basil Strandmann to Sergei Sazonov (July 24, 1941)).
51 . See id . at 462.
52 . Id . at 461.
53 . Id . (quoting Telegram from M.N. Pashitch to All the Serbian Legations Abroad (July
25, 1914), in COLLECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE
EUROPEANWAR 389, 390 (Foreign Office, Gr. Brit. ed. 1915)).
54 . Id . at 462 (quoting Telegram from Miroslav Spalajković to Nikola Pašić (July 25,
1914)).
55 . Id . at 463.
56 . Id . at 464.
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immediately recognized the response as “the most brilliant specimen of dip-
lomatic skill” he had encountered.57 The response “was perfectly pitched to
convey the tone of voice of reasonable statesmen in a condition of sincere
puzzlement, struggling to make sense of outrageous and unacceptable de-
mands.”58 This “highly perfumed rejection”59 of Austria’s demands left no
doubt that Austria would be the aggressor in the conflict that was almost cer-
tain to follow—one that Serbia willingly accepted with the full knowledge
that Russia would be at its side.
C. Russia: Sergei Sazonov & Nikolai Yanushkevich
Pašić’s story illustrates how solitude can help leaders maintain the kind
of “broader vision” that is difficult to sustain in the midst of a crisis (p. xix).
Berchtold’s reaction shows how easy it is to lose that perspective. The experi-
ence of senior Russian officials, however, shows that simply lurching from
one decision to another can have graver consequences: it can cause leaders to
compromise their core commitments. For much of the July Crisis, the Rus-
sian decisionmaking process looked like a master class in undisciplined pan-
ic.
For decades, the guiding principles of Russian defense policy had been
twofold: stay close to France and mobilize as quickly as possible.60 The
points were closely related. If Russia and France confronted Austria and
Germany together, then Austria and Germany would be forced to fight on
two fronts thousands of miles apart. To make that strategic calculus matter
on the ground, however, Russia would have to overcome her preindustrial
infrastructure and mobilize a large army roughly as quickly as her more
technologically advanced neighbors.61
This point was critical. Germany hoped, and the Franco-Russian mili-
taries feared, that a slow Russian mobilization would give Germany a free
hand in the West for long enough to knock out France before turning to
confront the Russians in the east.62 As a result, the Russian mobilization
schedules had been developed, refined, refined again, and kept up-to-date
with a single goal in mind: get as much of the army to the front as fast as
possible. Accordingly, the sole Russian mobilization plan called for a general
mobilization of the entire army.63
All of that nearly melted away in the course of a few high-pressured
bouts of apparent groupthink. Two Russian officials took the lead in re-
57 . Id . (quoting ALEXANDER MUSULIN VON GOMIRJE, DAS HAUS AM BALLPLATZ 241
(1924)).
58 . Id . at 466.
59 . Id .
60 . See id . at 123.
61 . See id . at 474.
62 . See id . at 331.
63 . Id . at 476.
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sponding to news of Austria’s ultimatum: the Foreign Minister, Sazonov,
and the Chief of the General Staff, Yanushkevich.64 On July 24, the day after
Austria delivered its ultimatum to Serbia, Sazonov met with the Austrian
ambassador.65 News of the ultimatum had enraged Sazonov, and he accused
the Austrians of pursuing war and “setting fire to Europe.”66 Before he had
time to cool off, Sazonov summoned Yanushkevich.67 He and Sazonov
agreed that Russia should plan “for a ‘partial mobilisation against Austria-
Hungary alone.’ ”68 Given a sufficiently cramped view of the strategic situa-
tion, that suggestion made good sense. It was Austria-Hungary that had
threatened Serbia. Perhaps the full weight of the entire Russian military
would not be needed to deter the Austrians. And, by mobilizing against Aus-
tria alone, Russia might be able to show Germany that it had no desire for a
general European war. Having reached their decision, Sazonov and Yanush-
kevich convened the full Council of Ministers that advised the tsar, which
approved their proposal.69
Apparently nobody pointed out the elephant in the room (and mind you
this room was full of Russia’s most senior ministers): Russia had no plan for
a “partial mobilization.”70 In light of Russia’s longstanding strategic objec-
tives, its sole mobilization schedule was “a seamless whole, an all-or-nothing
proposition.”71 Modifying the plan on short notice was therefore not merely
impractical; it was dangerous. “Improvising an Austria-only mobilization”
would have “wreak[ed] havoc on the immensely complex arrangements for
rail transit” and would have jeopardized “Russia’s ability to make the transi-
tion to a full mobilization” that would be required for war with Germany.72
In light of these problems, “it is astonishing that the partial mobilization
policy was ever given serious consideration.”73 But it was—indeed, the plan
was not only approved, it was personally modified by the tsar.74 Perhaps the
ministers were seduced by the prospect of a half measure, rather than a gen-
eral mobilization that would likely trigger a continental war. But the “super-
ficial appeal” of such an option would have required Russia to abandon its
64 . Id . at 472–73.
65 . Id . at 471–72.
66 . Id . at 472 (quoting Letter from Count Frigyes Szapáry to Count Leopold von Berch-
told (July 24, 1914)).
67 . Id .
68 . Id . at 473 (quoting S.K. Dobrorolsky, La mobilisation de l’armée russe en 1914, 1923
REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE LAGUERREMONDIALE 53, 64 (Fr.)).
69 . Id . at 474–75.
70 . Id . at 476.
71 . Id . (quoting Bruce Menning, Russian Military Intelligence, July 1914: What St . Pe-
tersburg Perceived and Why It Mattered, 77 HISTORIAN 213, 244 (2015)).
72 . Id . at 476–77.
73 . Id . at 477.
74 . Id .
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core goals and longstanding strategic commitments.75 Yet Russia’s most sen-
ior ministers apparently stood ready to do so. The partial mobilization thus
reveals “a certain disjointedness at the apex of the Russian executive.”76 Un-
der pressure, it did not display disciplined focus or the ability to reason from
Russia’s key objective to the steps it ought to take to achieve them.
Much like the mistakes of Austria-Hungary, the decision to order a par-
tial mobilization had no immediate consequences. Eventually, the Russian
leadership realized that they had no such plan prepared and that Germany
would enter the war either way.77 In fact, the general mobilization that fol-
lowed got the Russian army to the front more quickly than the Germans had
expected.78 The example nevertheless demonstrates how, for want of the
conviction that follows from solitude, leaders can lose sight of what ought to
be their core commitments.
One should take the role of solitude in these episodes, as we do, with an
appropriate serving of salt. Nobody is suggesting that solitude (or its ab-
sence) played a decisive role in the course of the First World War. What we
are suggesting is that Pašić came to the crisis with a broader strategic vision
and firmer conviction than his Russian and Austrian counterparts—which
are two of the key benefits of solitude that Kethledge and Erwin identify. It is
at least possible that he did so because he spent the first several hours of the
crisis alone with his thoughts, without being immediately overwhelmed by
the thinking of others.
III. INTERVIEWS
Having concluded that the authors’ vision of solitude passes muster
when checked against other historical examples, we turn to our interviews
with leading American lawyers. Like the nonlawyers described in the book,
they too find solitude in different ways, which range from physical activity to
simply carving out quiet time alone. A trial lawyer with a national practice
does some of her most important preparation outside the office during the
time she sets aside to kayak. A federal appellate judge and working mother
uses her intuition to know when she needs to step away from others and re-
gain perspective. And a U.S. attorney follows a disciplined routine that leaves
him with two hours to read and reflect each morning.
Joan Lukey is one of America’s leading trial lawyers. She has tried
roughly 100 cases to a jury, and she was the first woman elected to serve as
president of the American College of Trial Lawyers.79 She currently leads the
Complex Trial and Appellate group at Choate, Hall & Stewart, in Boston,
75 . Id .
76 . Id .
77 . Id . at 508–09.
78 . See id . at 524–25.
79 . Joan A . Lukey, CHOATE, HALL & STEWART LLP, https://www.choate.com/attorneys/
joan-lukey.html [https://perma.cc/3SJH-A9Q4].
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Massachusetts.80 She was previously a partner at WilmerHale and Ropes &
Gray.81
Given the demands that come with a major trial practice, it is unsurpris-
ing that Joan feels pressure to be constantly available and “plugged in.”82 Our
legal culture and her practice make it hard for Joan ever to do “just one thing
at a time.” That is particularly true in the office, where the hum of emails,
phone calls, and requests for meetings can occupy nearly every moment. For
much of her career, Joan has therefore carved out time alone to do some of
her most important thinking in unconventional places. For Joan, like many
of the leaders featured in the book, solitude always has been “tied to physical
activity.” Every opening or closing that Joan has crafted in recent years has
been outlined and refined while she is kayaking (or, during the winter
months, running).
In advance of a trial or major argument, Joan aims her kayak “straight
into Buzzard’s Bay,” off the coast of Massachusetts. Then she “works as hard
as she can, and goes as fast as possible.” “It’s not relaxing,” but time and
again Joan has found that these sprints help her “cut through the static” of
everyday life and get to “the heart of the issue,” as the judge or the jury will
see it. There are no electronics on the water, and it is one of the only places
where Joan can escape from the distractions that come with her professional
obligations. “It’s the only way I can clear my mind and cohesively concen-
trate on what will resonate with the decisionmaker.” Joan therefore sets aside
enough time to be on the water multiple times each week—and more as trial
or a major argument approaches, when analytical clarity is at a premium.
Joan Larsen is a Circuit Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit.83 Before her appointment to the Sixth Circuit, Judge Larsen
was a justice on the Michigan Supreme Court, a professor at the University
of Michigan Law School, and an attorney in the Justice Department’s Office
of Legal Counsel.84
Judge Larsen uses solitude to “step back and reflect,” which she finds is
best done alone.85 That usually means walking her dog around her property
and leaving the electronics at home. Judge Larsen does not use those walks to
think through any particular issue but rather to clear her mind and regain
perspective: “It’s helpful to find small moments to step away and say, ‘what
do I need to focus on now?’ ” Those small moments come at different times,
80 . Id .
81 . Id .
82. The information in the next two paragraphs is derived from an interview the au-
thors conducted with Joan Lukey on August 28, 2018.
83. 163 CONG. REC. S6943–44 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2017) (statement of Sen. Grassley);
Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR SIXTH CIR., http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/judges
[https://perma.cc/T2BZ-QH69].
84. 163 CONG. REC. S6943–44 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2017) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
85. The information in the next four paragraphs is derived from an interview the au-
thors conducted with Judge Larsen on August 31, 2018.
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and Judge Larsen does not schedule them in advance. “It’s not intentional
and it’s not planned. I know there are people who schedule sixty minutes of
yoga or meditation each day. That’s not me. I’m a working mom. I don’t
have time for that.”
But Judge Larsen instinctively knows “when [she] needs to block others
out.” And she has done so before making crucial decisions, such as whether
to become a judge. Judge Larsen was appointed to the Michigan Supreme
Court in 2015, while she was teaching at the University of Michigan.86 If she
accepted the appointment, she expected to run in two state-wide elections
over the next three years. After discussing the issue with several other peo-
ple, Judge Larsen knew she needed to “spend time alone in quiet reflection”
before making her decision.
That is also how Judge Larsen chooses to draft some of her most difficult
opinions. Although technology has no doubt contributed to information
overload, it also can be deployed in the service of solitude. Armed with her
laptop, Judge Larsen can draft opinions in her screened porch, with a view of
the water (and no cell phone). “Just looking at the water helps me clarify my
thoughts.”
By deliberately doing the hard analytical work of drafting alone, Judge
Larsen takes after her former boss, Justice Scalia, for whom she clerked after
law school.87 As a law clerk, Judge Larsen just knew that the justice should be
left alone when his door was closed. The justice’s son had a similar perspec-
tive. Christopher Scalia recalled his father at work in his study as “a distant
figure, to be left alone to read and write,” often listening to Bach as he draft-
ed opinions.88 But Judge Larsen observed another way in which Justice Scalia
used solitude. “He spent a lot of time in prayer, and he went to mass often.
It’s my impression that he did so not only out of a sense of religious obliga-
tion, but because it recharged him; it recharged his soul.”
Russell Coleman is the U.S. attorney for the Western District of Ken-
tucky.89 Russell began his career in law enforcement as a special agent with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where he worked on national security,
white collar, and violent crime investigations.90 He is a certified hostage ne-
gotiator and a former member of the National Joint Terrorism Task Force.91
In 2007, he volunteered for an assignment to Iraq in support of Operation
86. 163 CONG. REC. S6943 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2017) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
87 . Id .
88. Christopher J. Scalia, Opinion, My Father, Antonin Scalia, WASH. POST (Feb. 19,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/my-father-antonin-scalia/2016/02/19/
46ff9678-d679-11e5-be55-2cc3c1e4b76b_story.html [https://perma.cc/BR63-GWZ6].
89 . Meet the U .S . Attorney: Russell M . Coleman, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdky/meet-us-attorney [https://perma.cc/63BP-JQKW].
90 . Russell M . Coleman Sworn In as United States Attorney, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 22,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdky/pr/russell-m-coleman-sworn-united-states-attorney
[https://perma.cc/VN66-Y5JG].
91 . Id .
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Iraqi Freedom.92 Before being appointed to his current position, Russell was
a partner at Frost Brown Todd, LLC.93
Russell approaches solitude from the perspective of a convert.94 “I used
to laugh at these executives who said they needed to block out time for
thinking or creativity, but that was then and this is now.” In recent years,
Russell has found that he does his clearest thinking when he is by himself
and distractions are at a minimum. Time alone, however, has been in in-
creasingly short supply throughout the day. So Russell has built solitude into
his day at the only time his schedule as a father, husband, and government
official will allow.
“I don’t like getting up at 4:00 or 4:30 in the morning,” but Russell has
done so each day for the last several years. Seated in his leather chair with a
cup of coffee, Russell takes that time every day to read and pray. Most of the
time, Russell reads books about history or works through upcoming public
remarks. For Russell, the darkness, the quiet, and the absence of distrac-
tions—“the technology isn’t buzzing at 4:00 in the morning”—are a “perfect
storm that triggers creativity,” and it is often when Russell’s “best ideas
emerge.” Russell has become so committed to his routine that he feels “be-
hind the eight ball for the rest of the day” if he misses it. Particularly so be-
cause it is difficult to find a substitute. “There is no analogue during the
day.”
Sometimes, however, Russell needs to make a difficult decision on the
fly, without having had an opportunity to reflect on it in advance. “That’s the
nature of law enforcement; we can’t always anticipate what is going to pop
up.” Even during those times, Russell tries to create some time alone, so that
he can “kick the key ideas around in [his] head” without input from others.
Recently, Russell was confronted with a difficult prosecutorial decision. After
discussing with his subordinates, he ended the meeting and sent everyone
out of the room so that he could reflect alone before making his decision.
“The key is to create time when I am not multitasking, when I can have a
single, unilateral focus. That’s when I do my best thinking.”
CONCLUSION
Like Russell Coleman, we came to this subject with a healthy dose of
skepticism. Perhaps because we are both extroverts who enjoy team settings,
we would not have expected solitude to play such an important role in lead-
ership. Add our names to the ranks of the converted. By the end of the book,
we were persuaded, and we expect others will be too: one of the historical ex-
amples or interviews will call to mind how the reader does his or her best
thinking, and we are willing to bet that important parts of it are done alone.
92 . Id .
93 . Id .
94. The information in the next three paragraphs is derived from an interview the au-
thors conducted with Russell Coleman on September 14, 2018.
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That doesn’t mean that lawyers will be able to embrace all the book’s
recommendations. Absent a radical change in how we structure our working
days, we could not readily “mark off sixty or ninety minutes on [our] calen-
dar[s] each day for time to think” (p. 182). And one of us is nervous that
permitting emails to go “unanswered for hours rather than minutes” might
require him to find a new job (p. 182). (The other has life tenure.)
The benefits of solitude, however, are profound—particularly in a pro-
fession that puts a premium on analytical clarity. Figuring out how to use
solitude most effectively likely requires a highly personalized process of trial
and error. Nevertheless, it is one we look forward to, not only because the
book has convinced us to pursue it but also because it has equipped us with
dozens of examples and recommendations on how to do so.
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